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When is using medication to lessen psychological pain an ethically defensible choice?  
"Cosmetic Neurology" and the Problem 
of Pain 
By Anjan Chatterjee, M.D. 
July 30, 2007  
Few people would argue against treating the traumatic psychological effects of war or 
violence. But what about taking a drug to lessen the pain of our common daily struggles, 
such as the end of a relationship or anxiety about one’s job? Is this a “cosmetic” 
enhancement of human life, even a danger to character, or is it an ethical choice? For 
guidance, the author looks to the history of treating physical pain and argues that, 
despite growing knowledge of the biological basis for psychological pain, many find it 
hard to find a consistent principled position when it comes down to specific instances of 
alleviating human suffering. 
We are all familiar with —and many are troubled by—athletes who use medications, 
legal or otherwise, to enhance their performance. This practice is an early indication of a 
much larger trend. As neuroscience advances, we are getting better at treating cognitive 
and emotional disorders, and we are also learning how to improve cognition and modify 
emotions in basically normal, healthy people—for example, by increasing alertness or 
lessening fear. I have coined the term “cosmetic neurology” for this practice.1  
Cosmetic neurology raises four major ethical concerns. First is a concern about safety. 
We weigh the potential risks and side effects of a new medication for a disease against 
the potential benefits. In health, are any risks worth taking? For example, musicians often 
use beta-blockers to dampen tremors and anxiety associated with public performance. 
Occasionally, however, beta-blockers are associated with a life-threatening anaphylactic 
(allergic) reaction in which a it’s not always clear that an individual would be better off 
without the drug. What some might see as a dubious or even dangerous enhancement, 
others believe is an ethical means of relieving suffering. person’s blood pressure drops 
and breathing stops. Is the better concert worth this risk? Second is a concern about 
distributive justice: If cosmetic neurology succeeds in making people smarter and 
happier, will these enhancements be available disproportionately to the affluent? Third is 
a concern about coercion. Will healthy people be or feel forced to take such medications, 
either because it would serve a greater good (for example, airline pilots being required to 
take a drug to increase alertness if that made flying safer) or because of competitive 
pressures? 
Finally—and this is the focus of this article—ethicists and others have expressed a subtle 
but deep concern about ways in which manipulating our emotional lives might erode 
character, both individually and communally. This was a fundamental concern raised by 
the Presidential Commission on Bioethics and highlighted in its 2003 report, Beyond 
Therapy.2 If, as many religions and philosophies argue, struggle and even pain are 
important to the development of character, does the use of pharmacological interventions 
to ameliorate our struggles undermine this essential process? 
The widespread practice of cosmetic neurology seems inevitable, and resolving this 
concern will not be easy. Many people share an underlying discomfort with how things 
might play out. But when we consider specific instances of using a medication to affect 
emotion and treat psychological pain, it’s not always clear that an individual would be 
better off without the drug. What some might see as a dubious or even dangerous 
enhancement, others believe is an ethical means of relieving suffering. 
In my view, the history of the treatment of physical pain, including “natural” pain, 
anticipates the treatment of psychological pain. Similar tensions are certainly at play. 
This claim is predictive, not prescriptive—I am neither advocating nor decrying the use 
of cosmetic neurology. I am, instead, pointing out how deeply difficult it is for anyone, 
ethicists included, to adopt a consistently principled position on the problem of pain. 
The Varieties of Cosmetic Neurology 
The pharmaceutical and other interventions that we place under the heading of cosmetic 
neurology target the human motor, cognitive, and emotional systems. The functioning of 
our motor system can be enhanced by influencing the cardiovascular, peripheral motor, 
and central nervous systems. For example, both the hormone erythropoietin and the drug 
sildenefil can be used by athletes to increase the oxygen-carrying capacities of their blood 
and provide better endurance, and drugs that act on receptors for the neurotransmitter 
dopamine may very well improve our ability to learn new motor skills. 
Attention, memory, and learning can also be altered in healthy people, sometimes with 
drugs developed to treat a disease and sometimes with treatments created specifically to 
enhance cognitive abilities. Medication that boosts the effects of the neurotransmitter 
acetylcholine, used widely to treat symptoms of Alzheimer’s disease, has been shown to 
improve alertness and attention in healthy people, as has modafinil, a drug used to treat 
sleep disorders such as narcolepsy. Stimulants such as atomoxetine, which is used to treat 
attention deficit disorder, are also likely to improve levels of alertness in normal 
individuals. In addition to these currently available drugs, new classes of drugs that could 
be used as cognitive enhancers are being investigated. Some of these promote structural 
changes in neurons that accompany the acquisition of long-term memories. These 
drugs—molecules with names like “ampakines” and “cyclic AMP response element 
binding protein modulators” that may one day sound as familiar as “statins” do today—
are designed not to treat pathology but to exploit normal biological processes, with the 
hopes of improving memory. 
Finally, and most relevant to this discussion, our understanding of the brain basis of 
emotions continues to grow, as does our ability to modify the systems related to various 
emotions. Take, for example, fear. It is clear that a brain structure Most reasonable people 
agree on the urgent need to ease the psychological burdens imposed by significantly 
traumatic events. called the amygdala, located within the temporal lobe, is involved in 
regulating the effects of fear and our responses to it.3 The amygdala receives signals from 
pain pathways, from higher-order perceptual processing areas, and from the 
hippocampus, an area long known to be essential to the formation of memory. The 
amygdala, in turn, sends signals to the hypothalamus, which regulates stress hormonal 
responses, and to areas of the brain that regulate arousal, such as the locus ceruleus. Thus, 
the amygdala is a critical structure that controls our experience of fear and colors our 
perception and memory of fearful events. As shown in recent experiments4, the effects of 
fear on memories can be dampened by local infusions of beta-blockers (long used to treat 
high blood pressure), thereby helping with symptoms of anxiety. 
The drugs called serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) are commonly used to treat 
depression and anxiety, but they could have wider applications. For instance, research on 
primates has shown that infant monkeys that have been abused have lower serotonin 
levels in their brains than those who have not been maltreated, and those infants with the 
lowest levels are more likely to become abusive adults. Humans with a specific form of a 
serotonin transporter gene have abnormal amygdala activity and are especially prone to 
fear and anxiety, as well as to the effects of abuse. In healthy people, SSRIs promote 
“affiliative behavior,” or friendly positive behavior toward others. So one might argue 
that these drugs should be used even more widely than is the current practice. 
Just around the corner are several new ways of potentially controlling affective (mood) 
states by regulating neuropeptides, small proteins in the brain that influence how 
information is processed and that can be linked to quite specific behaviors. One such 
neuropeptide, corticotropin release factor, seems to influence neural changes produced by 
ongoing stress. These changes include lowered levels of neurotransmitters that influence 
attention and mood, such as serotonin, epinephrine and dopamine. Blocking corticotropin 
releasing factor, which would lower glucocorticoid levels, might blunt these long-term 
effects of stress. The hormone oxytocin might be used to induce trust. Other 
neuropeptides, such as substance P, vasopressin, galanin, and neuropeptide Y, are also 
being studied as potential targets for treating the brain’s emotional functions.  
Psychological Pain 
Most reasonable people agree on the urgent need to ease the psychological burdens 
imposed by significantly traumatic events. For instance, thousands of young men and 
women experience varying degrees of post-traumatic stress disorder following military 
service, and many of them fall through the cracks in our society. Few people would argue 
against treating such individuals, in the same way that few would argue against treating 
their physical ailments—even if, in practice, we fall short of treating either type of 
affliction. 
But what about less-severe traumas, or even the challenges of everyday life? Preliminary 
research suggests that beta-blockers may prevent post-traumatic stress symptoms when 
given to people who have gone to the emergency room after a car accident. In addition to 
dampening the emotional effects of memories after they form (retroactively), 
such Approaches to the problem of pain have historic precedents in the treatment of 
physical pain, particularly the use of anesthesia to ease the pain of surgery and of 
childbirth. medications could presumably be used proactively, when the memories are 
first encoded. If they are proven effective, and more such treatments become available 
soon, how widely would they be used? We could expect people to employ them for all 
sorts of “normal” traumas, such as remorse over wrongdoing or breakups in relationships 
and the other losses and disappointments that seem integral to our existence as humans. 
But what would be the long-term consequences of flattening these bumps in the road? Do 
we need the experience of pain to develop character? Beyond individual development, 
what is the role of pain in binding us communally? Researchers have learned that 
empathy for the experience of pain in others may be made possible by the observer’s own 
neural pain circuits, particularly through the anterior cingulate and the insula. If pain 
circuits are chronically dampened, would a person still be capable of empathy? Would 
our society be less caring of marginalized groups, such as those with mental illnesses and 
other disabilities?  
Anesthesia for Physical Pain 
Approaches to the problem of pain have historic precedents in the treatment of physical 
pain, particularly the use of anesthesia to ease the pain of surgery and of childbirth.5 In 
October 1846, William T. G. Morton, a dentist in Boston, gave the first public 
demonstration of the use of anesthesia in surgery; and on January 19, 1847, James Young 
Simpson, a Scottish obstetrician, used ether to facilitate the delivery of a child by a 
woman with a deformed pelvis. Simpson became a forceful advocate of the wide use of 
anesthesia for childbirth, a practice that was extremely controversial at the time. Medical 
discussions about the benefits and risks of anesthesia played a relatively minor role. At 
the heart of the objections was the social construction of the meaning of pain. In this 
light, treatment of pain was objectionable on three grounds. 
Pain as Natural. First, don’t mess with Mother Nature. Some pains are natural. We 
should not be meddling with the natural course of things, since we are not wise enough to 
predict the unintended consequences of our meddlesome ways. 
From the very beginning, some obstetricians objected to the use of anesthesia for 
childbirth on grounds that childbirth was natural and interventions such as the use of 
ether or chloroform invited medical disaster. As physicians took the possibility of side 
effects seriously and tried to mitigate them, safety became less of a concern and the 
popularity of anesthesia continued to rise. But the appeal of all things natural resurfaced 
with force in the mid 20th century, when Grant Dick Read promoted the natural childbirth 
movement and Ferdinand Lamaze published Painless Childbirth. A professional rivalry 
between Read and Lamaze increased the public’s awareness of the possibilities of natural 
childbirth, and in 1956 Pope Pius XXII gave a special address on the moral value of 
natural childbirth, giving these approaches spiritual weight. This address coincided with a 
period in which the public was losing confidence in medicine’s ability to alleviate illness 
and pain. 
Pain as Punishment. Second, spare the rod, spoil the child. Sometimes we deserve to be 
punished. Pain, as a form of punishment, structures individuals and orders our society. To 
mitigate pain would make for a society of sinners as we succumb to our lesser angels. 
Pain plays a central role in many religious traditions and is often viewed as an 
acknowledgment of human imperfection. The link between the pain of childbirth and 
punishment is made explicitly in Genesis 3:16:  “Unto the woman he said, I will greatly 
multiply thy sorrow and thy conception; in sorrow thou shalt bring forth children.” The 
notion of pain and suffering as deserved is evident in other traditions as well, and self-
infliction of pain as an act of atonement remains prominent in Christian, Muslim, and 
Hindu belief. Similar views of the role of pain as punishment can be observed in secular 
institutions. For many years, brutal public executions were sanctioned to serve as both 
public entertainment and education. Humanists debated the use of pain in legal systems, 
and despite prison reform movements, the general impression that social order would 
disintegrate if the law did not use its authority to punish and inflict pain remains robust. 
In this view, relieving deserved pain would be hubris at best, and more likely an 
invitation to chaos. 
Pain as Progress. Third, no pain, no gain. Learning to cope with pain strengthens and 
deepens us. Mitigating pain could cheapen us, individually and communally. 
In spiritual frameworks, pain serves as a vehicle for transcendence. The Christian symbol 
of the cross exemplifies the link of sacrifice and salvation. In secular views, pain builds 
character. Writers have explored the experience of pain and suffering as integral to 
larger-than-life characters in literature, such as Hamlet and Faustus. F. Scott Fitzgerald 
claimed, “You especially have to hurt like hell before you can write seriously,”5 a 
sentiment echoed by others who have linked pain to creativity. 
Pain also serves to strengthen social bonds. Religious views that a God that punished also 
healed meant that communities rejoiced together in that healing. The pain of childbirth 
and the real possibility of death meant that neighbors and family and friends supported 
the event in a way that often formed lifelong social bonds. As childbirth A growing 
international consensus calls for effective treatment of pain as a fundamental human 
right. moved from the home to hospitals in technically developed countries, many of the 
rich social and cultural traditions were reduced to ritualistic baby showers. Perhaps in 
partial reaction to this sterile approach, in 1948 the Royal College of Obstetrics and 
Gynecology found that half of 15,000 British women interviewed preferred delivery in 
their home, which meant with a midwife and without anesthesia. Such attitudes fluctuate 
over time, but concerns about the “medicalization” of childbirth remain germane today. 
In 2002, the British Medical Journal devoted a special issue (Vol. 324, 13 April) to 
discussions of medicalization trends in general, and note with some alarm the rise in 
Cesarean section deliveries and the inappropriate use of fetal monitoring.  
Reinterpreting Physical Pain 
Despite the various ways in which the treatment of physical pain was (and sometimes 
continues to be) viewed with mistrust, the use of medications and anesthesia for pain 
management is now widespread. Indeed, a growing international consensus calls for 
effective treatment of pain as a fundamental human right. 
Two reinterpretations of pain facilitated this change. First, the classification of pain as a 
biological phenomenon diluted the impact of religious interpretations. When Simpson 
began administering ether to women giving birth, he emphasized that the pain of 
childbirth was a consequence of anatomy and not divine wrath, even suggesting that God 
was an advocate of anesthesia, as evidenced by his putting Adam into a deep sleep to 
extract the rib that would become Eve. In the early 20th century, the physiologist Sir 
Charles Sherrington observed that complex behavior could be analyzed as a set of 
coordinated neural reflexes. The discovery of various sensory receptors and the signaling 
of pain by specific neural pathways made explicit the possibility that pain could be 
altered, lessened, or even blocked. This mapping of physical pain onto its biology helped 
frame the treatment of pain as simply one more mechanical manipulation. 
Second, in the late 19th century, the public attitude toward pain and suffering of all kinds 
shifted. William James wrote, “A strange moral transformation has, within the past 
century, swept over our Western world. We no longer think that we are called on to face 
physical pain with equanimity. . . . The way our ancestors looked upon pain as an eternal 
ingredient of the world order, and both caused and suffered it as a matter-of-course 
portion of their day’s work, fills us with amazement.”5 This transformation occurred in 
the setting of broad-based humanitarian movements dedicated to the relief of suffering in 
many forms. Women’s suffrage, and abolitionist, prison reform, child labor reform, and 
anti-vivisectionist movements gathered force during this period. Alleviating physical pain 
fell naturally within the purview of these humanitarian efforts. 
Psychological Pain as Biological 
In exploring ethical concerns about anesthetizing psychological pain, the differences 
between it and physical pain are less relevant than the similarities of their underlying 
neurobiology and, therefore, of their socially constructed meaning. 
Physical pain produces neural responses that fractionate into three components.6 First is 
the sensory experience itself, which is processed in the brain by parts of the 
somatosensory cortex and by a deep structure called the thalamus. As such understanding 
of the neurobiology of emotional systems deepens, treatment of psychological pain 
becomes easier to view as a mechanical rather than a metaphysical manipulation. Second 
is the subjective sense of “unpleasantness,” which is often, but not always, correlated 
with the intensity of the pain sensation. This subjective sense of unpleasantness is 
accompanied by neural activity in the insula, which controls our autonomic nervous 
system, and the anterior cingulate, which integrates the cognitive experience of pain with 
its emotional aspects and establishes priorities for responding to the pain. 
Finally, pain also produces what is called the “secondary pain affect,” which refers to 
emotional feelings about the long-term implications of having pain that can last long after 
the inciting physical pain. The neural basis of the secondary pain affect is not well 
understood, but it is thought to emerge from an interaction of the anterior cingulate, 
insula, amygdala, and prefrontal cortex. These same parts of the brain are also part of the 
distributed network that coordinates emotional distress and its interactions with our 
cognitive systems. We can see how physical and emotional pain converge in the brain. 
As such understanding of the neurobiology of emotional systems deepens, treatment of 
psychological pain becomes easier to view as a mechanical rather than a metaphysical 
manipulation. Similarly, it is hard not to see such intervention in humanitarian terms, 
rather than as a cosmetic “enhancement.” In addition to the wave of post-traumatic stress 
disorder that will soon be upon us as a result of veterans returning from the Iraq war, 
some estimate more than a quarter of the American population suffer from affective or 
addictive disorders.7 How could anybody object seriously to the alleviation of this 
suffering, even if it means that others might take the same pills for more trivial reasons?  
The Ethical Dilemma of Pain 
We face a fundamental problem in trying to establish a coherent ethical position on 
ameliorating psychological pain. The general unease shared by most people about 
ubiquitous treatments of such pain coexists with competing and conflicting attitudes 
about specific situations. 
We can worry about loss of character individually and communally at the same time that 
we are willing to frame psychological pain in biological terms or consider its treatment a 
broad humanitarian goal. We might share the general sense that some things are best left 
alone, but we are unlikely to agree on which specific things are best left alone. We might 
share the general sense that pain serves a purpose in establishing order, but we are 
unlikely to agree on which My claim is not that everyone will use medications to 
alleviate the bumps and bruises of everyday living. It is that more and more medications 
will become available for this purpose and at least some people will find it ethically 
acceptable to use them. pains can be justified and for whose version of order. We might 
share the general sense that pain can be a vehicle for character development, but we are 
unlikely to agree on which specific pains are worth enduring for a greater good. If the 
same person weighs these considerations differently for each situation, and changes the 
relative weightings of these considerations for the same situation at different times, then 
how could one possibly have a coherent reflective position? 
The holding of contradictory beliefs with unstable relative weightings makes it extremely 
unlikely that ethicists, as a group, will be able to speak with one voice. As a result, they 
will be unlikely to shape social norms that could guide a coherent practice of 
anesthetizing psychological pain or provide a basis for public policy. Without such 
restraint, aspects of cosmetic neurology, at least the practice of modifying emotional 
systems in basically healthy people to lessen suffering, great or small, will flourish. 
My claim is not that everyone will use medications to alleviate the bumps and bruises of 
everyday living. It is that more and more medications will become available for this 
purpose and at least some people will find it ethically acceptable to use them. Anesthesia 
for childbirth is available to virtually everybody in technically developed countries, but 
some choose to use it and some do not. The extent of general use of interventions for 
psychological pain will fluctuate with people’s faith or frustration with science, 
technology, and medicine. 
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